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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Minority Picketing and Allied Activities Under the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
In September of 1959, Congress enacted the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act,' which includes several
amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. One of these
amendments deals directly with the problem of peaceful picket-
ing for recognitional and organizational purposes by a minority
union. The purpose of this Comment is to conduct a brief survey
of past Board decisions on the issue of peaceful striking and
picketing and to examine the possible impact of the new labor
act in this area.
Section 7 of the Wagner Act 2 of 1935 guaranteed employees
the right to join labor organizations and to engage in other con-
certed activity. Although the act placed restrictions on employer
conduct which might interfere with these rights, there was no
provision which proscribed any union activity. However, in 1947
the Taft-Hartley Act amended Section 7,3 guaranteeing an em-
ployee not only the right to engage in concerted activity, but also
the right to refrain from union activity if he so desires. The act
also denominated certain types of union conduct as "unfair."
Among these was that proscribed by Section 8 (b) (1) (A) ,
which provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in Section 7. This provision has given rise to a problem
of interpretation as to whether 8 (b) (1) (A) should be construed
as encompassing peaceful picketing by a minority union for
recognitional purposes. This section might be interpreted as not
prohibiting any union activity, regardless of its objective, as
long as the activity is peaceful. On the other hand, it might be
held that by picketing for recognition, a minority union is at-
tempting to force the employer to recognize the union, despite
the fact that it does not represent a majority of his employees.
Such a recognition would be a violation of the employees' rights
1. 73 STAT. 519 (1959).
2. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1935).
3. Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., amending 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 141, 157 (1935): "Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities. . . ... This section
is hereinafter referred to as Section 7.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1947).
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under Section 7 to choose their own bargaining representative.
In the cases involving 8(b) (1) (A) the Board has not dis-
tinguished between strikes and picketing, treating both activities
in the same manner. The National Maritime Union case 5 was the
first to arise under 8(b) (1) (A). There the union engaged in a
peaceful strike in an effort to force the employer to sign an un-
lawful hiring hall agreement. The trial examiner found that the
union had violated 8(b) (1) (A), as the purpose of the strike was
to coerce the employer into signing the agreement, which in turn
would force the non-union employees to join the union. The
Board reversed the trial examiner, stating that the "legislative
history of 8(b) (1) (A) strongly suggests that Congress was in-
terested in eliminating physical violence and intimidation by
unions or their representatives, as well as the use by unions of
threats of economic action against specific individuals in an ef-
fort to compel them to join."' , Conceding that the strike was for
an illegal objective, the Board continued: "The touchstone of a
strike which is violative of 8(b) (1) (A) is normally the means
by which it is accomplished, so long as its objective is directly
related to the interests of the strikers and not directed primarily
at compelling other employees to forego the rights which Section
7 protects."' 7 This case is the leading authority for the proposi-
tion that 8(b) (1) (A) does not proscribe peaceful striking or
picketing.8  /
The Board's position was affirmed less than three months
later in the Perry Norvell case.9 A work stoppage was prompted
by the discharge of an employee. When the recognized union de-
clared that the strike was unauthorized, several employees
formed a committee to organize a new union and continued the
strike. During this suspension of work the committee demanded
5. National Maritime Union of America (The Texas Company), 78 N.L.R.B.
971 (1947).
6. Id. at 985. One of the most often quoted passages was Senator Taft's answer
to Senator Morse's observation that § 8(b) (1) (A) would outlaw all strikes to
further organization activities: "I can see nothing in the pending measure which,
as suggested by the Senator from Oregon (Morse), would in some way outlaw
strikes. It would outlaw threats against employees. It would not outlaw anyone
striking who wanted to strike. It would not prevent anyone using the strike in
a legitimate way, conducting peaceful picketing or employing persuasion. All it
would do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion as would prevent people
from going to work if they wished to go to work." 93 Cong. Rec. 4436 (May 2,
1947).
7. 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 986 (1947).
8. The Board did find that the union violated § 8(b) (2), which prohibits a
union from attempting to force an employer to discriminate against an employee.
9. Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
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that the employer recognize the new union. The employer re-
fused, and hired replacements to resume operations. At this time
the strikers began to use threats and other violent tactics to
keep production at a standstill. The employer's complaint alleged
that aside from the violence involved, the strike itself was a
violation of 8 (b) (1) (A) in that it attempted to deprive the em-
ployees of their Section 7 rights; more particularly the right to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing. The Board, relying primarily on its decision in National
Maritime Union, concluded that the strike, considered alone, was
not proscribed by 8 (b) (1) (A). The Board further reasoned
that if this were not so, Section 8 (b) (4) (c),10 which prohibits
a strike for recognition where another union is certified, is
superfluous. If 8(b) (1) (A) prohibits a strike where there is
no certified union, it would necessarily proscribe one where an-
other union is certified. Consequently, it would overlap the
scope of 8 (b) (4) (c) entirely. Although the incidents of violence
and threats made to the employees were found to violate 8(b)
(1) (A), the Board stood firm on its position as to peaceful ac-
tivity, following its decision in National Maritime Union.
In neither of the 'above cases was the majority or minority
status of the union at issue. The problem of a peaceful strike by
a minority union for an illegal objective was presented to the
Board in the Miami Copper Co. case." There, one union was
certified, but the minority Smelter Workers Union struck to
force the employer to settle grievances of the individual em-
ployees in the certified union outside the presence of the certi-
fied representative. The employer alleged that the Smelter
Workers violated 8(b) (1) (A) because through economic pres-
sure they forced employer action which infringed upon the stat-
utory rights of the employees. The Board, assuming without de-
ciding that the employees' rights were violated, found that 8 (b)
(1) (A) was not applicable, citing National Maritime Union as
authority.
The Board continued to apply the National Maritime rule2
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (C) (1947) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents to engage in, or to induce or encourage the
employees of any employer to engage in, a strike ...where an object thereof is:
forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor
organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization
has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of
section 9."
11. 92 N.L.R.B. 322 (1950).
12. District 50, United Mine Workers of America, 106 N.L.R.B. 903 (1953)
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until the case of Curtis Bros. Inc.13 in 1957. A minority union
was found guilty of an 8 (b) (1) (A) violation when it peacefully
picketed for recognition after losing a certification election. The
Board reasoned that since the union was in the minority, the
employer could not lawfully recognize it as the bargaining rep-
resentative of his employees. With the picketing, the union was
attempting to cause economic loss to the employer; and the em-
ployees could not escape a share of the damage caused to the
business on which their livelihood depended. Therefore, the
picketing was indirectly coercing the employees in the exercise
of their right to choose their own bargaining representative. To
the union's contention that the legislative history did not sup-
port such an interpretation of 8 (b) (1) (A), the Board answered
that the legislative history was not conclusive. To support its
position, the Board cited several passages which would make it
appear that the activity here complained of was within the ambit
of 8 (b) (1) (A) .14 The Board attempted to distinguish National
Maritime Union and Perry Norvell by pointing out that in those
cases it was not found that the union's objective was exclusively
for recognition, and that picketing for recognition was not "di-
rectly related to the interests of the strikers." The Board then
stated: "on the other hand, to the extent that these cases cited
seem contrary to the results reached here, we would be remiss in
our duty were we to consider what is at best dubious precedent
as overcoming the clear policy of the statute as a whole."'15 The
Board made it clear that this interpretation of 8 (b) (1) (A) was
to be applied only where the union's purpose was recognition, as
opposed to organization. Apparently, then, picketing for organi-
Painters District Council No. 6, 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951) ; Medford Building and
Construction Trades Council, 96 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951) ; United Construction Work-
ers, 94 N.L.R.B. 1731 (1951). In two cases the Board found an 8(b) (1) (A)
violation because the object of the strike was directed at compelling an employee
to forego his rights under Section 7. See Pinkerton's National Detective Agency,
90 N.L.R.B. 205 (1950), where the object of the strike was to force the employer
to discriminate against a non-union employee. See also Clara Val Packing Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 703 (1949), where the union threatened to strike if the employer did
not discharge an employee who had breached the union's picket line.
13. 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957).
14. Senator Taft offered the case of Hall Freight Lines, 65 N.L.R.B. 397
(1946) to demonstrate that economic pressure by a minority union could induce
employees to join against their own wishes. Senator Pepper objected because there
was no physical violence involved, to which Senator Taft replied: "The main
threat was, 'Unless you join our union, we will close down this plant, and you
will not have a job.' That was the threat, and that is coercion-something they
had no right to do." 93 Cong. Rec. 4023 (1947). Later in the debate, Senator
Taft stated: "There are plenty of methods of coercion short of actual physical
violence." 93 Cong. Rec. 4024 (1947).
. 15. 119 N.L.R.B. 232, 246 (1957).
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zational purposes, i.e., to force the employees to join the union,
was not to be treated as an unfair labor practice under 8 (b) (1)
(A). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the
Board, finding that peaceful picketing was not proscribed by
8(b) (1) (A).' 6 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari, and
is scheduled to review the case in 1960.
Two weeks after the Curtis Bros. case, the Board handed
down its decision in the Alloy Manufacturing Company case,17
where a similar situation was involved. There, after being re-
fused recognition by the employer, the minority union not only
engaged in picketing for recognition, but also placed the em-
ployer on a "We do not patronize" list. The Board relied on the
Curtis Bros. case in finding that the picketing was an unfair
labor practice, and on this occasion overruled National Maritime
Union to the extent that it was inconsistent. Furthermore, the
Board declared that there was no legitimate basis for distin-
guishing between recognitional appeals made by picketing and
appeals effected through the means of blacklisting, since both
tactics bring pressure to bear on the employer, and in turn on
the employee. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not have to de-
cide whether the picketing violated 8 (b) (1) (A), because the
union conceded that the picketing was violative of another sec-
tion of the act. 8 But as to the question of blacklisting, the court
reversed the Board, finding that this activity is protected as
free speech under the First Amendment. At least one other cir-
cuit court has had occasion to pass on the Curtis Bros. doctrine.
The Fourth Circuit in the O'Sullivan Rubber Corp. case' 9 adopt-
ed the Board's finding that a minority union's picketing for
recognition was violative of 8(b) (1) (A) notwithstanding the
absence of violence. The Board has continued to apply the Cur-
tis Bros. doctrine to all cases in which a minority union picketed
for recognition.20
16. Drivers Local 639 v. N.L.R.B. [Curtis Brothers, Inc.], 43 L.R.R.M. 2156
(D.C. Cir. 1958). The court relied on legislative history and Sections 8(b) (4) (C)
and Section 13 in holding that 8(b) (1) (A) does not proscribe peaceful picketing.
Section 13 provides that nothing in the act should be construed to interfere with
a strike, except where specifically provided.
17. Alloy Manufacturing Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957).
18. N.L.R.B. v. I.A.M. Lodge 942 [Alloy Manufacturing Co.], 43 L.R.R.M.
2548 (9th Cir. 1959). The union conceded that it violated Section 8(b) (2) which
provides that a union may not cause or attempt to cause an employer to discrimi-
nate against an employee.
19. N.L.R.B. v. Rubber Workers [O'Sullivan Rubber Corp.], 44 L.R.R.M. 2465
(4th Cir. 1959).
20. Shepherd Machinery Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 320 (1957) ; Ruffalo's Trucking
Service, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1958) ; Fisk & Mason, 120 N.L.R.B. 135 (1958) ;
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One of the 1959 amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act goes to
the very crux of the problem faced in Curtis Bros. The new pro-
vision, Section 8(b) (7) ,21 enumerates the instances in which
picketing "where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization"
(recognition) or "forcing or requiring the employees of an em-
ployer to accept or select such labor organization as their col-
lective bargaining representative" (organization) will be an un-
fair labor practice. Subsection (A) will prohibit these activities
where the employer has lawfully recognized another union, and
Subsection (B) where there has been a valid election within the
preceding twelve months. Both of these provisions seem to be
applicable to both majority and minority unions, and should
serve primarily to protect the stability of the employer-employee
labor relations. Subsection (C), on the other hand, appears to
be directed primarily at minority unions, and is of greater sig-
nificance to this discussion. This provision will prohibit both
rlarou, Inc., and En Tour, 120 N.L.R.B. 659 (1958); H. A. Rider & Sons, 120
N.L.R.B. 1577 (1958) ; Andrew Brown Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1958) ; Biltmore
Furniture Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1728 (1958) ;Alling & Covy Co., 121 N.L.R.B.
315 (1958) ; Machinery Overhaul Co., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1958). In the most
recent case involving minority picketing for recognition, the Board's decision was
rendered after the 1959 statute was passed. But because the unfair labor prac-
tice took place before the new act was passed, the Board found a violation of
8(b) (1) (A) and did not apply the new amendment. Sierra Furniture Co., 45
L.R.R.M. 1075 (1959).
21. 61 STAT. 136, § 8(b) (7) (1947) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
union or its representatives:
"(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his em-
ployees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select
such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such
labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
"(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act
any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not
appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act,
"(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section
9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
"(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under sec-
tion 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days
from the commencement of such picketing. Provided, That when such a petition
has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section
9(c) (1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the
labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appro-
priate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That Nothing in
this sub-paragraph (0) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other pub-
.licity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that
an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organ-
ization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by
any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or trans-
port any goods or not to perform any services.
"Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which
would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section (8) (b)."
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recognitional and organizational picketing unless a representa-
tion petition is filed within a reasonable time, not to exceed
thirty days. If a petition is filed, the Board is to conduct an elec-
tion, without requiring the hearing and showing of a substantial
interest that normally must precede a certification election. It
appears then that the minority union which pickets for the pur-
pose of either recognition or organization is going to be in a vul-
nerable position. If no representation petition is filed, the pick-
eting will become violative after a reasonable time, not to exceed
thirty days. Just what criteria the Board will use in determin-
ing a reasonable time remains to be seen, but, as indicated, in
no event may the picketing exceed thirty days. However, if a
minority union engages in this type of picketing, it is more than
likely that the picketed employer will file the petition; and an
election will ensue. The union, not representing a majority of
the employees, will necessarily lose the election. Then, Subsec-
tion (B) of the new amendment will come into play, prohibiting
any further recognitional or organizational picketing for twelve
months; and Section 9 (c) (3)22 of the act will preclude another
certification election for the same period of time. Therefore, it
is unlikely that a minority union which hopes to become the cer-
tified representative in the near future will engage in any recog-
nitional or organizational picketing.
From a literal reading of Subparagraph (c) of the new Sec-
tion 8(b) (7), it would appear that a majority union might use
this provision to circumvent the normal delays required before
a certification election would be ordered. In other words, the
requirements to obtain the expedited election would appear to be
met if the union threw up a picket line, either recognitional or
organizational, and then filed a representation petition. How-
ever, in its recently published rules of interpretation, 23 the NLRB
stated that no election would be held under these circumstances,
unless an unfair labor practice charge had been filed against the
picketing union. This apparently leaves the employer to deter-
mine whether or not an expedited election will be held, leaving
the majority union with very little to gain by engaging in this
activity.
With the new amendment, Congress is apparently endorsing
22. 29 U.S.C. § 159(3) (1947) : "No election shall be directed in any bargain-
ing unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a
valid election shall have been held ..
23. 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959).
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the Board's position in Curtis Bros., that recognitional picketing
by a minority union is an unfair labor practice. However, it has
gone one step further by proscribing organizational picketing as
well. The distinction between these activities has been vague
at best, and in several cases in which the picketing union has
claimed that its purpose was organization, the Board has found
that an additional purpose was recognition, and therefore viola-
tive of 8(b) (1) (A). 24
There is one further provision in Subsection (C) which
should lead to some very interesting problems of interpretation.
Subsection (C) provides that nothing in the subsection should be
construed to prohibit picketing or any other method of publicity
directed at informing the public that an employer does not have
a union contract or that he employs non-union workers. There
is, however, one exception to this provision. Where the informa-
tional activity causes an employee of another employer to refuse
to perform services, then the activity becomes unfair. The prob-
lem of interpretation will arise if the activity causes unsolicited
secondary refusals to work. For example, suppose a union, with
no intent of causing any refusals to work, employs a single
picket, for the purpose of advising the public that a certain em-
ployer has no union contract. However, a union truck driver of
another employer refuses to deliver while the picket is there.
Then, according to the wording of the proviso, the picket would
be illegal. But it may be that the Board will require an intent
to produce the secondary effects before it will consider the infor-
mational activity as an unfair labor practice.
An application of the new legislation to a hypothetical situa-
tion will reveal a few of the possible problems that may arise.
Supose that a union which is clearly in the minority demands
recognition from the employer. Upon his refusal, the union sets
up a picket line with the intention of exerting enough economic
pressure on the employer and the employees so that (1) the em-
ployer will recognize the union despite its minority status, or
(2) the employees will become members, even against their own
choosing. Under Subsection (C) of the new amendment, the
picketing union has a maximum of thirty days within which it
24. In the following cases, the union has claimed that the picketing was for
organization, but the Board has found an auxiliary purpose to be recognition:
Fisk & Mason, 120 N.L.R.B. 135 (1958) ; Harou, Inc., and En Tour, 120 N.L.R.B.
659 (1958) ; H. A. Rider & Sons, 120 N.L.R.B. 1577 (1958). In Shepherd Ma-
chinery Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 320 (1957), union claimed to be picketing for a union
shop, but Board found that another purpose was recognition.
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must file a petition if the picketing is either recognitional or or-
ganizational. Therefore, when thirty days have elapsed, and the
union has not filed a petition, the employer could file an unfair
labor practice charge under 8 (b) (7) (C), and the Board would
probably enjoin the picketing. Suppose further that the union
then puts out a single picket, whose sign reads, "Unfair, No
Union Contract." At first blush this appears to be the very
activity which the new amendment will protect, i.e., informa-
tional picketing. Of course, if an employee of another employer
refuses to perform services because of the presence of this picket,
this activity may be considered as illegal, as specifically provided
in the new amendment. But, if no secondary refusals to work
are caused by the picket, the employer nevertheless might file an
unfair labor practice charge under 8(b) (7) (C), claiming that
this is still recognitional or organizational picketing. The union
would undoubtedly claim that the picketing was strictly for the
purpose of informing the public that the employer had no union
contract. However, in view of the preceding events, the Board
might easily find that the actual purpose of the picket was still
to exert enough economic pressure on the employer so that the
union would be recognized, or the employees would join, and
therefore the picket would be illegal.
A further problem might develop if the union persisted in its
efforts by posting a leaflet distributor at the employer's place of
business, or placing the employer on a "We do not patronize"
list. These activities would appear to be covered by the provision
that protects activities designed to inform the public that the
employer has no union contract. Of course, they might be en-
joined if they caused secondary refusals to work, as previously
mentioned. But suppose that no such effects are caused, and that
the actual result of these activities is to exert economic pressure
on the employer and his employees, just as the picket had. In
this case it is possible that the Board might enjoin these activi-
ties in reliance on the last sentence of the new amendment. This
sentence reads: "Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be con-
strued to permit any act which would otherwise be an unfair
labor practice under Section 8(b) .'25 It is arguable that here
Congress was endorsing the Board's position in the Alloy case,
where it refused to distinguish between picketing and blacklist-
ing, finding both to be coercive and violative of 8(b) (1) (A). If
2.5. See note 21 8upra.
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so, the Board might rely on this section to prohibit both of the
informational activities mentioned above. It is submitted that
such an interpretation could raise serious constitutional ques-
tions in the area of free speech.2 . While the Supreme Court has
allowed certain restrictions to be placed on picket lines, 27 it has
continued to protect other informational activities.28
In conclusion, it is submitted that the new amendment has
definitely answered one question. Peaceful picketing for the
purpose of either recognition or organization will be prohibited
unless the picketing union files an election petition within a rea-
sonable time, not to exceed thirty days. The other problems dis-
cussed do not seem quite so clear. The Board will probably find
itself making the determination of whether the purpose of the
picketing is recognition or organization, or merely "to inform
the public," in numerous cases. This determination will not al-
ways be an easy one, and will have to be decided on the facts of
each case. As to the other forms of publicity that the union
might use to "inform the public," it appears that they remain
protected. Even if the Board were to rely on the last sentence
of the new amendment to enjoin these activities under 8 (b) (1)
(A), it is doubtful that the injunctions would stand under the
First Amendment. Therefore, the minority union has lost its pri-
mary means of exerting pressure through picket lines, but it still
may resort to these allied activities, which may well be just as
coercive in accomplishing the same objectives.
Peyton Moore
26. This is the very issue on which the Ninth Circuit reversed the Board in
the Alloy case.
27. In Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1949), where the Cali-
fornia state court had granted an injunction against peaceful picketing, the Court
said: "But while picketing is a mode of communication it is inseparably something
more and different. Industrial picketing 'is more than free speech, since it involves
patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may
induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas
which are being disseminated.'"
28. Id. at 465: "Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars,
may convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling
a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it
produces consequences, different from other modes of communication. The loyalties
and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from
appeals by printed word."
1960]
